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SQUARE WITH THE HOUSE : THE CASE FOR ENDIN G
EX-OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

I.

Introduction
From time to time and for a variet y of reasons, people commit crimes. This

is, of course, unavoidable in any system of justice. Once the offender is caught,
convicted, and repays the harm he caused , he should be free to re-enter societ y
and pursue a happy and productive life.

However, for many of the nearl y

600,000 incarcerated ex-offenders released each year in the United States , the
path to reentry is permanentl y blocked because they are excluded from many of
the best employment opportunities based on nothing more than their criminal
history. 1 Without a chance at meaningful em ployment, these ex-offenders will
never full y reintegrate into societ y and will instead be transformed into an
underclass of citizen.

Some may even perceive they have no option but to

return to the criminal path that led them to their conviction in the fi rst place to
support themselves.
This paper will examine the reasons for and against allowing employment
discrimination against ex -offenders.

In Part II, it will introduce the problem

and the t ypical players who are affected by the practice. In Part III, it will lay
out the anal ytical framework describing how offenders should be punished, and
will explore why employment discrimination is both a common practice and a
bad idea. In Part IV, the paper will compare employm ent discrimination against

1

Steven Greenhouse, From Jail Cell to the Job Market: Conservatives Back Work Programs for ExInmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at B1.
1

ex-offenders to the practice of debarment .

Part V will explore past solutions

that address ex -offender discrimination and attempts to reduce recidivism with
employment, and why they have failed.

Part V I will then recommend new

solutions, including outlawing employment discrimination, relying on employers
to supervise ex-offender workers rather than the government, and creating an
insurance program to reduce the risks that employers face in hiring ex -offenders.
Finall y, Part V II will conclude by stating that ex -offender discrimination must
be outlawed if ex-offenders are ever to trul y reintegrate and become functioning
members of societ y.
II.

An Illustrative Example
Larry Schanuel’s criminal history appears to tell the story of a m an who

has had brushes with the law but has paid for his crimes. In April 1963, he pled
guilt y to Second Degree Robbery and in Jul y 1967, he pl ed guilt y to a charge of
Transferring Government Obligations. 2
expired in 1972.

3

His parole period for those offenses

Apparentl y having repaid his debt to societ y, Schanuel

applied to the Allied National Detective Agency of Belleville, Illinois, seeking
employment as a private detective. 4 He was denied this opportunit y because
state law prohibited private detective agencies from employing “individuals who
have been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude unless ten years
have passed from the discharge from a ny sentence imposed therefore.” 5 This
2

Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 318, n1 (7th Cir. Ill. 1983).
Id. at 318.
4
Id. at 318-19.
5
Id. (quoting 11 ILL. REV. STAT. § 2622(1)).
3

2

meant that Schanuel, regardless of how good a candidate he was, could not
enjoy the benefits of such employment until at least 1982, ten years after he had
served the entiret y of his sentence.
Unsatisfied with being relegated to a class of unemployable workers,
Schanuel filed suit on behalf of him self and other similarl y situated individuals,
alleging (among other things) that the prohibition against hiring ex -offenders
bore no rational relationship to a legitimate societal interest as required under
the Due Process Clause of the 14 t h Amendment and a line of cases within the
circuit holding that “[licensing or employment] qualification standards must
bear a rational relationship to the skills necessary for the job. ” 6 Ultimatel y, the
Court of Appeals for the 7 t h Circuit ruled against the def endant and rejected the
idea that a prior criminal history bore no rational relationship to the work
performed by detectives.

The court supported its decision with the simple

statement that it was “not unreasonable to suppose that the public trust might be
undermined by assigning [tasks relating to the guarding of persons and propert y]
to ex-offenders.” 7
Rules that allow discrimination against ex -offenders in employment are
not uncommon throughout the nation. 8 Not onl y are would-be private detectives
discriminated against, but so too are dancehall owners convicted of felonies,
6

Id. at 319 (quoting Thompson v. Schmidt, 601 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1979)).

7

Id.
See, e.g., Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for
Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People With Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18 (2005)
(tracing an extensive list of cases and rationales that courts have used to justify rules excluding exoffenders from employment in various fields).
8

3

firefighters with a history of arson, and taxicab drivers who have a criminal
history that suggest s bad moral character , just to name a few examples . 9 As the
practice of ex -offender discrimination is so widespread, it should follow that the
reasons underpinning it are not just based in “reason” and “common sense,” but
are well rooted in actual fact and research that shows such discriminatory
practices are effective at protecting the public and outweigh the harm inflicted
against the ex -offenders. In order to understand if they are effective or not we
must first understand how optimal punishments are determined.
III.

The Costs and Benefits of the Rule
a. A Starting Place: D = L / p
On its simplest level, the punishment of crimes is a fa irl y straightforward

idea. A criminal seeks to do an act because it will benefit him, but such an act
is deemed by society to be unacceptable and is therefore forbidden by law.
Take the simple example of a purse snatching: A criminal seeks the value of the
contents of the purse, but societ y has an interest in keeping its citizens free
from robbery and violence. Societ y will pass laws criminalizing the act of p urse
snatching and will assign a punishment sufficient to discourage individuals from
becoming pursue snatchers .

As Judge Richard Posner explains, societ y must

take into consideration various factors in order to determine the optimum value
of the punishment (D), including the harm caused by the criminal (L) and the

9

Id. at 44-45.
4

probabilit y of his being caught and made to pay ( p). 10

He expresses this

formula as:
D = L / p
Other scholars have expanded on th is simple formula to include other
variables in an attempt to make it more comprehensive and useful, but for our
purposes, it is sufficient in its current form. 11 From time to time, s ociet y can
amend D, depending on changes in L and p (e.g., to represent the increasing
losses from this sort of behavior or from advancements in law enforcement
technology that make detection more likel y, respectivel y).

Even retributivists

can insert an amount to be paid before the offender has satisfied his debt by
adding it to the right side of the equation.

However, the one constant is that

after D has been satisfied by the criminal (a fine paid or sentence served in the
event financial compensation is not possible or appropriate ), then no further
action should follow because the sociall y optimal level of punishment has been
achieved.

Any additional punishment will have negative effects, like over -

deterring behavior that is sociall y beneficial because it is too close to
punishable behavior, resulting in inefficiency.

12

Posner illustrates this

inefficiency with the example of a motorist who gives up driving because the
penalt y for speeding is death .

13

The inefficiency occurs because drivers will

not drive at all in an attempt to avoid the penalt y and societ y will lose the
10

Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 279 (8th Ed. 2011).
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 5-7 (1974) (in
which he splits D into the harm caused to society from the criminal act, reduced by the benefit received
by the criminal).
12
Id. at 280.
13
Id.
11

5

benefits of travel by car. 14 In an employment case like Schanuel ’s, one can
imagine that he would not confess to crimes , reveal them in employment
applications or enter into plea agreements in the first place because the risk of
punishment is so extreme th at it would preclude him from obtaining a reputable
job for the next decade on top of his other punishment .

Thus, societ y would

lose some of the benefits of plea bargaining (and a less expensive and more
quickl y resolved docket that comes with them) and honest y.
Why, then, impose a ten year prohibition on becoming a detective on exoffenders like Schanuel if he has already satisfied D by serving his sentence and
parole?
b. The Case for Discrimination
Posner suggests that the stigmatizing effect of a criminal history may
have some benefit to societ y and employers as it represents a signal to thos e
who would transact business with the criminal in the future. 15 Courts like the
one in Carl yle v. Sitterson appear to have embraced this idea .

16

In Carlyle, the

court supported the discharge of a firefighter upon learning of his convictions
for arson. 17 The court rooted its decision in “common sense ,” stating:
Common sense dictates that in many instances, the government must
have authorit y to separate employees because of conduct occurring
prior to the employment…This Court finds that any argument that
14

Id.
Id. at 281.
16
Carlyle v. Sitterson, 438 F. Supp. 956, 963 (D.N.C. 1975).
15

17

Id.
6

the defendants acted capriciousl y or arbitraril y in discharging the
plaintiff from the fire department because he was a convicted
arsonist to be totally devoid of merit. … Not onl y must the y
consider the past record and character of their employees, they must
also seek to insure continued public confidence in government and
the services it provides. 18
The “common sense” rationale advanced by this court a nd Posner
appears to be that since this person has committed a crime in the past, he
has communicated his possible intent to commit crimes in the future if
given the opportunity, and therefore, employers should be allowed to
avoid employing him.

Presumabl y, this will save the expense of future

similar crimes (L), and the related costs of prosecuting and punishing
them.
There is some weight to this argument as most ex -offenders will
commit crimes in the future.

For evidence we need onl y look as far as

any of the numerous studies on recidivism. One such study conducted by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics tracked the rele ase of nearl y 300,000
prisoners in 1994 (which accounted for nearl y two -thirds of the total
number

of

prisoners

released

that

year) .

19

Of

those

approximatel y 67.5% were re -arrested within three years. 20

300,000,
Similarl y,

there are no shortage of studies on the state level that come to the same
conclusion that the majorit y of offenders recidivate in the first two or

18

Id.
Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS (2002), available online at: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (Last Accessed
December 5, 2011).
20
Id.
19

7

three years after release. 21

Therefore, we can safel y conclude that an

employer does, in fact have a legitimate interest in protecting himself
from ex-offenders as they are more likely than not to engage in criminal
acts in the future .
Another consideration for the potential employer is the threat of
being sued for negligent hiring, which can occur if the employer knew or
should have known that his employee had propensities towards violence
due to his criminal history and such violence resulted after the hiring . 22
Such liabilit y has attached where an employer’s background check failed
to uncover an ex-offender’s past history of assault and burglary and a
workplace sexual assault occurred after hiring .

23

Though the court

stressed that such liabilit y can be avoided without banning all ex-offender
employment, t he common solution to avoiding t his liability has simpl y
been for employers to identify all ex -offenders and disqualify them for
employment at the application stage just to be on the safe side (as long as
and to the extent that law permits such discrimination) . 24
c. The Costs of Discriminati on
i. Purposeless Over -Internalization of Consequences
21

See, e.g., Recidivism, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2011), available online at
http://www.ct.gov/doc/cwp/view.asp?a=1492&Q=305970 (Last accessed December 5, 2011) (stating that
approximately 56% of offenders released in 2008 from Connecticut institutions were re-arrested within
two years); Offender Recidivism Figures, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA (2007), available online at
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/23/4winter2007/c_recidivism.html (Last accessed December 4, 2011)
(stating that approximately 60% of Alaskan ex-convicts recidivate within three years).
22
Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment
of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1302-1304 (2002).
23
Id., see also Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 908-913 (1983).
24
Leavitt, supra note 16,at 1302-04.
8

The mere fact that an e x-offender is a riskier choice for his
employer does not necessaril y mean that barring him from employment
makes economic sense. Take for example the arsonist-turned-firefighter
who would have been retained but for his past arson.

Why should his

prior act of arson matter to his future employment with a fire department ?
He already paid his debt to societ y for his arsons (D), and so, he has not
onl y reimbursed societ y for the cost of his bad acts (L), but has paid an
additional cost taking into account the unlikelihood he would be caught
(p). Being a rational actor, he should be one of the least likel y individuals
to attempt the same act again as he should have an exaggerated
expectation of being caught based on his past experience. It is of course
tempting to argue that criminals are irrational actors (and that is why they
commit crimes in the first place), but as Posner points out, the availabl e
empirical evidence shows that even cr iminals are rational actors , taking
into account opportunit y costs, the probabilit y of being caught, and the
severit y of any potential punishment . 25 Therefore, we can only conclude
that societ y is engaging in over -deterrence and is forfeiting sociall y
beneficial activities as Posner predicted because ex -offenders are being
compelled to suffer a loss greater than D.
ii. The Fear of Recidivism is Exaggerated
The fear of recidivism is not a convincing argument for supporting
a bar against these employees as far as safet y to societ y is concerned.
25

Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 279 (8th Ed. 2011).
9

While it is admittedly true that an ex -offender is more likel y than not to
commit a crime in the future, there is no reason to believe that denying
the

ex-offender

recidivism.

employment

opportunities

will

reduce

the

risk

of

For example, the arsonists was not a firefighter before his

conviction and still managed to commit the arson that led to his removal.
The same holds true for Larry Schanuel, whose crimes of fraud and
robbery were committed without the aid of a detective’s license.
In fact, many commentators believe that discriminating against ex offenders in employment actuall y increases the risk of recidivism. 26 Some
of these commentators observe that employment is good for ex -offenders,
not onl y because it provides for their survival by giving them a paycheck,
but also because work promotes regular social interaction, communit y
involvement, increased self-esteem, and social control on the ex -offenders
that will reduce recidivism.

27

Some researchers believe that such

opportunities for meaningful employment actuall y reduce recidivism,
becoming increasingly effective as the ex -offenders age. 28
At the very least, by p roviding the ex -offender with attractive
employment opportunities, the opportunit y costs of forgoing them and
instead choosing a life of crime increases, thereby making recidivism less
likel y.

Conversel y, denying employment opportunities would mean the

26

See, e.g. Christy A. Visher, Laura Winterfield & Mark B. Coggeshall, Ex-offender employment
Programs and Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis, J. OF EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINALOGY, 295-315 (2005).
27
Id. at 295-96.
28
Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age,
Employment, and Recidivism, AM. SOC. REV., Vol. 65, No. 4 ( 2000), pp. 529-46.
10

opportunit y cost for choosing a life of crime becomes less, and recidivism
should go up.
However, none of this means that an individual employer who hires
an ex-offender is not taking a risk by doing so. The news is replete with
examples

of

how

ex-offenders

have

harmed

their

employers

and

coworkers. 29 Thus, even though denying employment opportunities to ex offenders harms societ y as a whole (by increasing the total likelihood of
recidivism), it is rational for the employer to engage in this practice
because he does not full y internalize risks societ y faces in general, but
onl y those that he himself has to absorb. Put another way, the employer
would rather have the ex -offender recidivate against his neighbor
frequentl y than against his own interests even once.

iii. Discriminatory Tastes Are Always Expensive
Employers who discriminate have tastes for or against certain types
of employees. For example, an employer who refuses to hire ex -offenders
has a taste favoring non -offenders. Economists like Gary S. Becker have
found that employers who discriminate based on tast e are increasing their
own cost, either because they are willing to endure reduced incomes or

29

See, e.g., Stephen P. Shepard, Negligent Hiring Liability: A look at How It Affects Employers and the
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-offenders, 10 APPALACHIAN J. L. 145, 148-49 (2011) (describing
how a convicted sex offender raped other employees after being hired).
11

pay more for the same quantit y and qualit y of labor . 30

To illustrate

Becker’s theories, sup pose that the entire workforce consists of two
groups,

E

(ex -Offenders)

and

N

(non -offenders),

who

are

perfect

substitutes (in this scenario, this means that an employer has no merit
based reason to prefer one group over the other). 31 In the equilibrium
marketplace, with no discrimination, the wages paid to these workers
would be equal.

However, if some employers have a taste for N (such

taste represented by d), the wages (W) they are willing to pay to N
increase.

This increase repr esents the amount that the discriminating

employers are willing to pay to avoid transacting with their disfavored
group. 32 The inefficient wage is represented by the equation W N = W(1 +
d). Similarl y, if the market as a whole contains many employers with a
similar or greater taste preference, then the prevailing wages paid to non offenders can be expected to increase further. Since the wages are higher,
the quantit y of the products the empl oyer produces is reduced because the
employer’s costs of production are increased . This harms the employer as
his net revenues are reduced. This harms the societ y as the total level of
production is less than the non -discriminatory equilibrium, resulting in
fewer products and higher prices.

Too see why, consider the following

graph representing a labor market in which discrimination has increased
costs:
30

See Gary S. Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2nd ed., 1971).
This analysis parallels Becker’s analysis of the effects of racial discrimination. Id. at 13-44. However,
as Becker points out, his analytical framework can be applied to any discriminatory practice, including
race, gender, bloodline, or even to people with “unpleasant” personalities. Id. at 11.
32
Id. at 14.
31
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Figure 1

Here we see employers have absorbed an additional cost of
production, in this case, the inflated wage caused by discrimination. This
increase in costs shifted the suppl y of whatever product the employer
produced from S to S’, which resulted in both higher prices (P’) and
lower quantit y supplied (Q’) than would otherwise be available had the
market operated in equilibrium (where P=Q). Hence, we see that societ y
has suffered as a whole because it has to make do with less and pay mor e
as a result of discrimination . However, the employers do not just suffer
because societ y in general suffers but because their total revenues are
reduced as illustrated in Figure 2:
Figure 2

13

Here, we see that even though employer s are able to charge a higher
price (now at point P’) for the products or services supplied, they still
lose out overall as their total revenue (the shaded rectangle on the right
diagram) is now smaller than if they did not discriminate at all, sold at a
lower price, and sold more units. Therefore, both employers a nd societ y
suffer as a direct result of discriminatory hiring practices.
Such discriminatory practices also harm the discriminated against
part y because, obviousl y, they are not hired or are hired only at reduced
wages compared to their counterparts.

Surp risingl y, even the preferred

group may be harmed because the employers are less ab le to hire workers
because the marginal cost of hiring them is higher, and employers will
onl y hire workers until marginal cost equals their marginal product. Thus,
discrimination ultimatel y leads the employer to pay increased marginal
costs for labor, produce less, and sell at higher prices, leaving everyone
involved in a worse place than had discrimination not occurred.

14

In many markets, discrimination is at least partiall y controlled by
the fact that an employer who engages in discrimination puts himself at a
comparative disadvantage to those employers who do not have as high a dvalue. This is because the groups that do not discriminate as much face
lower margin al costs, and can expand more quickl y compared to their
more discriminatory counterparts. 33 However, in the labor market, this
counteractive force on ex-offenders is minimized if not eliminated
entirel y because there is often an expectation or requirement imposed on
employers that forces them to engage in discriminatory practices.

This

can be in the form of a law that requires discrimination as was the case
with Schanuel’s detective licensing .

Alternativel y, social norms and

expectations can create this discriminatory requirement , as when the
Carlyle

court

observed that the

government

“must” ensure public

confidence and “must” take into account a firefighter ’s past involvement
in an arson. Even if an employer would not have a comparativel y low d value, he would be required to increase his to the market’s d as it is
expected or required of him. Therefore, employers are particularl y likel y
to engage in discrimination against ex-offenders as there is no advantage
in not doing so.
IV.

33

Searching for an Analogy: Debarment

Id. at 44.
15

Since there was no period in which the labor market was entirel y
free from the ancient tradition of ex -offender discrimination, 34 it is not
possible to find conclusive evidence that its absence will be beneficial or
not, even if economic theory su ggests that it should be.

However,

evidence is available that suggests a similar practice, debarment, does
have the negative discriminatory effects that economic anal ysis would
suggest.
Debarment refers to when certain individuals or organizations are
made ineligible to receive government contracts after engaging in
prohibited conduct like fraud, waste, or abuse . 35 Such a scheme closel y
parallels employment discrimination in general because after conviction
of a crime, employers will not hire ex -offenders, in effect “debarring”
them from future employment opportunities .

Therefore, lessons learned

from studying the effects of debarment should be instructive as to the
effects we can expect from ex -offender discrimination. 36
Researchers have found that debarm ent is a preferable method to
incarceration because it is less expensive than administering f ines and
imprisonment. 37 This is because debarment does not require the state to

34

See infra Part V for a discussion of the incomplete efforts that have been attempted to reduce exoffender discrimination.
35
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,549, 51 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 18, 1986); see also FAQ, EXCLUDED PARTY
LIST SYSTEM, https://www.epls.gov/epls/jsp/FAQ.jsp#1 (last accessed November 30, 2011).
36
See John R. Lott, Jr., The Effect of Conviction on the Legitimate Income of Criminals, 34 ECON.
LETTERS 381 (1990).
37
Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions (November 8, 2010). Competition
Policy International, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 3-39, Autumn 2010; George Mason Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 10-60. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705701 (Last accessed Dec. 17, 2011).
16

pay for the holdin g and care of a prisoner or provide for the collection of
fines, but instead diminishes the offender’s future earnings (by denying
them access to contracts they otherwise may have been awarded), which
itself acts like a deterrent. The additional debarment deterrent eliminates
or at least reduces the total fine and inc arceration period necessary to
achieve any given level of deterrence. 38 Debarment itself can even act as
a t ype of shaming, discrediting the target in the communit y, and therefore
is a form of free punishment which costs the state virtuall y nothing yet
still acts to deter offenders.

Finall y, the Supreme Court has held that

debarment is a constitutionall y permissible practice. 39
However, any system utilizing debarment has drawbacks. First, the
effect of debarment is progressive , so it will punish some offenders more
than others even though they committed the same crime.

Research has

shown that the higher the income the offender had prior to the debarment,
the more painful the penalt y because the amount of lost future earnings
increases dramaticall y.

40

For offenders with more limited income

potential, the deterrent effect of debarment is far diminished and is
unlikel y to effectively prevent future bad conduct . 41 Such a “punish the

38

Id. at 19.
See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157–60 (1960); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105
(1997); see also Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 74.
40
Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Criminal Conviction on Income and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,”
29 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 62, 75-76 (1994); see also see also Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 57.
41
Waldfogel, supra note 40, at 76.
39

17

wealthy” effect is a perversion of justice because offenders committing
the same offense “pay” different penalties. 42
Also, by allowing the communit y to take into account the offender’s
reputation, the offender may be permanentl y disadvantaged and suffer a
lifelong loss of income potential.

Research has shown that the loss of

income is more than what can be accounted for by the loss of experience
caused by the offender’s period of exclusion from the marketplace, which
strongl y suggests an en during stigmatizing effect, depressing the ex offender’s future earnings. 43 This effect can continue until the end of the
offender’s life, and therefore, would greatl y exceed the optimal penalt y (a
higher fine or additional incarceration) the offender would have otherwise
been required to serve.
Thus, we see that allowing a stigma attach to an offender is both
unjust and economicall y unwise because it allows enhanced penalties for
well-to-do offenders and because its potential harm to the offender can far
exceed the optimal level of damages the of fender is expected to pay. An y
s ystem that allows discrimination based on reputation, including ex offender employment discrimination, should not be utilized in a societ y
that

favors

equal

treatment

of

offenders

proportional to the injury inflicted.
V.
42
43

Past Attempts to Correct the Problem

Id. at 82.
Id. at 67; see also Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 3 note 57.
18

and

punishment

that

is

The problem of ex -offender employment discrimination is by no
means a new one, and legislation has frequent l y been passed to address it .
Just a few of the prior examples of ex -offender employment pr ograms
include the Baltimore Living Insur ance for Ex-Prisoners (LIFE) program,
the Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP), Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA), and the Job Corp. 44

These programs attempted to reduce

recidivism through gainful employment using a wide range of strategies
and evaluation methodologies .

Some, like Job Corp, consisted of

residential programs that emphasized vocational training of some 60,000
ex-offenders aged 16-24 drawn from throughout the country. 45 Others,
like TARP, focused on just 4,000 ex -offenders in two states where
employment enrollment assistance was provided. 46 Still others, like LIFE,
merel y provided financial support to ex-offenders to see what would
happen. 47

Despite their different strategies and methods, a ll of these

programs boiled down to the same conclusion in the end - not one of them
demonstrated any statisticall y appreciable effect on the reduction of
recidivism. 48
The most obvious reason as to why these employment-based
initiatives failed to reduce recidivism is that they failed to address the
underl ying

cause

of

unemployment

44

caused

recidivism

For a detailed description of each program, Visher, supra note 26, at 304
Id. at 304.
46
Id. at 301.
47
Id. at 300.
48
Id. at 309-310.
45

19

–

i.e.,

discrimination.

None of the studies listed above prohibited employer

discrimination, nor addressed the risks empl oyers face when hiring ex offenders. Without addressing these underl ying causes of the problem,
there is little reason to believe that any amount of aid given to ex offenders in the form of training, financial support, or job placement
assistance will reduce recidivism.
VI.

Suggested Solutions
a. The Two-Pronged Approach
In order for any employment -based anti-recidivism program to be

effective it must both prohibit employer discrimination against ex offenders and mitigate the risk employers face from hiring ex -offenders.
A

two-prong

statutory

scheme

that

first

prohibits

employment

discrimination based on ex -offender status, including the mere inquiry
into such status, and second insures the employer to help offset the harm
that employers face when an employed ex-offender recidivates and causes
harm to him would be effective in addressing this problem .
The most obvious means of prohibiting ex -offender employment
discrimination is simpl y to make it illegal. This can be accomplished by
simpl y adding the term “ex -offender status” to the list of enumerated
protected classes in existing anti-discrimination statutes such as those that
already protect against discrimination based on race, sex, color religion,
and national original, like the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 or simila r
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state legislation. 49 Some states have already moved in this direction, the
most notable being Wisconsin which is currentl y considered to offer both
the simplest and strongest protections for ex -offenders. 50 The statutory
scheme in Wisconsin, at least on its face, prohibits all use of criminal
histories or arrest records , and even the act of inquiring about the
existence of such records, by both private and public employers making
employment or licensing decisions just as it prohibits discrimination
based on age, race, creed, color, disabilit y, marital status, sex, national
origin, ancestry, and a number of other protected classes. 51 However, it
specificall y exempts all ex-offender discrimination in which the employer
can show the ex-offender’s previous offenses are of a t ype that
“substantiall y relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed
activit y,” or if it is a job that requires fidelit y bonding that cannot be
obtained without a criminal history check. 52 Furthermore, the legislature
also allows discrimination on a long list of enumerated crimes, from
failing to register for selected service to the unlawful manufacture of
controlled substances.

53

Thus, while founded on the right idea of

49

Specifically, the Civil Rights Act prohibits, among other things, employers from failing or refusing to
hire, discharging or “otherwise discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2.
50
See also Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking a tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the
Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (2002).
51
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 – 322, 335; See also Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking a tightrope:
Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281,
1288-1294 (2002) (Describing the Wisconsin statutory scheme as well as a number of other states
attempts to protect ex-offenders from employment discrimination).
52
Wis. Stat. 111.335(1)(c)
53
Id.
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protecting ex -offenders from employment discrimination, the exceptions
eviscerate the law’s potential.
Suppose, however, that such a scheme were enacted without any of
the exceptions. In such a situation, employ ers would hire ex-offenders as
often as they would hire iden ticall y qualified non -offenders because the y
would have no reason not to (and would be prohibited from seeking such a
reason).

As a result, recidivism would be expected to drop because, as

mentioned earlier, ex -offenders can obtain legal means for their survival
by receiving paychecks instead of needing to turn to crime for support and
because work promotes regular social interaction, communit y involvement,
increased self-esteem, and social contro l over the ex-offenders. 54

As

recidivism decreases, societ y saves as it pays for fewer trials and
detentions, as well as the corresponding salaries of judges, police officers,
and other employees who are no longer needed as the total amount of
crime declin es - a significant consideration in a $228 billion per year
industry. 55 Furthermore, even in the unlikel y event that recidivism rates
did not fall, societ y would still benefit as a whole because with more
workers in the labor market, the wage demanded for each worker falls and
employers, faced with reduced costs, will be able to produce more goods
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Visher, supra note 26, at 295-296 (2005).
Employment and Expenditure, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, available online at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=5, (Last accessed November 22, 2011) (reporting that state,
local and federal spend approximately $228 billion for police protection, corrections, and judicial and
legal services in 2007).
55

22

and services, resulting in Figure 1 operati ng in reverse as it approaches
equilibrium .
Employers fearing negligent hiring suit s should also benefit under
the proposed legislation .

As discussed earlier, an element of negligent

hiring is having known or should have known of an individual’s
propensit y for criminal acts, and failing to search a criminal history can
give rise to a negligent hiring suit. 56 Under the proposed statutory scheme,
however, this fear should be eliminated because an employer is prohibited
by law from knowing or even inquiring about ex -offender status. Thus, an
employer cannot be held liable for hiring an ex-offender.
Despite all the potential benefits of the proposed statutory scheme,
it is certain that recidivism will still be a problem. Even if it diminishes,
there is no authority that suggests that it will be eliminated entirel y.
Further, it stands to reason that an ex-offender who recidivates will do so
locall y, or to those around him, and his employment means he will often
have a close proximit y to his employer and coworkers.

Therefore,

employers have a legitimate fear of an ex -offender committing crimes
against him, or at least that affect him or his other worker’s productivit y,
and therefore will still not want to hire the ex -offender.

However, this

risk exists whether the employer hires the offender or not and whether or
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See, e.g., Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 908-913 (1983) (holding that an employer fails to
exercise reasonable care, and thus exposes itself to negligence liability, by hiring an ex-offender whose
criminal history would have demonstrated his propensity to commit acts of violence, as long as the
employer knew or should have known of such propensity.)
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not there is a law prohibiting ex -offender discrimination. An arsonist, for
example, who is likel y to repeat his offense due to some internal
propensit y to destroy may choose to destroy a building belonging to his
employer. However, even if he is unemployed, he will destroy someone’s
building if he recidivates, and the chances of the target being one of those
of interest to the employer are significantl y diluted as there is less reason
to expect the ex -offender will be spending much of his time near the
employer. However, the loss to societ y is the same – a building is lost.
The onl y difference between the proposed scheme and the current pro discrimination schemes currentl y in force are that the employers are
permitted to try to protect themselves by reducing the chance that the
building in question will be of value to them.
If the employer were required to hire ex -offenders, it stands to
reason that such destroye d buildings would be far fewer. For one thing,
as mentioned before, the employed ex -offender has less free time in which
to plot and carry out his criminal agenda as more of his time is consumed
by the employer.

Similarl y, he will be less likel y to recid ivate for the

other reasons mentioned above, such as his reconne ction with the
communit y and an increased imposition of societal control on his behavior,
again resulting in fewer burned buildings.

Finall y, if the ex -offender

were employed, he would be sup ervised and monitored by an interested
part y – the employer – who does not want the ex -offender to destroy his
propert y.

Furthermore, the employer should watch all his employees
24

anyway to ensure productivi t y and to provide them instructions, so the
incremental cost of this additional monitoring should be negligible . The
currentl y available alternative would be for a disinterested parole officer
to conduct similar monitoring. The parole officer is disinterested in the
sense that he neither owns the resources that the ex -offender would
destroy or steal should he recidivate, nor does he s pend prolonged periods
of time around the ex -offender (certainl y not a traditional 40 hour week of
supervision the ex -offender would receive in a t ypical work week wi th his
employer).
Since societ y has saved through reduced recidivism (including the
costs of the correspond ing litigation, imprisonment, and disruption to
societ y from criminal activit y) and the diminished need to maintain parole
and supervising functio ns over released ex -offenders as this cost is shifted
to employers, society would be able to redirect a portion of their savings
into an insurance program for employers who suffer harm by recidivating
ex-offenders.

Such a program would reduce or eliminate the risk that

employers faced from hiring ex -offenders, and would diminish their taste
for discrimination against this riskier class of workers as they become a
safer choice. Even with these insurance payments, societ y would be better
off financiall y because the total amount of payment would be less than the
losses societ y would have suffered had employers remained able to
discriminate.
b. Likely Criticism
25

There are two likel y arguments that would be made in opposition to the
proposed two-prong solution. First, the “common sense” notion that exoffenders should not be given the means to commit their crimes again and
second, the idea that ex -offenders are “unworthy” to receive the same
protections as other, legitimatel y disadvantaged groups.
Proponents of the “common sense” approach

would

argue that

preventing ex -offender employment discrimination onl y multiplies the
harm ex-offenders do by giving them access to the means to commit the
crimes

they

have

already

shown

themselves

willing

to

commit.

Continuing with our familiar example, this would mean that we would
expect to see ex-arsonist firefighters allowing fires to burn or even
feeding them if we did not allow employers to prevent such ex -offenders
from serving as firefighters.

I have been able to locate no evidence to

show that this the ory is rooted in any studies. Instead, the notion appears
to be premised on “common sense” wisdom of the sort that taught us that
heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones . Admittedl y, there is a certain
distasteful reaction to giving ex -murderers guns when they become police
officers, or allowing ex -child molesters from s erving as kindergarten
teachers, but should there be such a reaction?
In many cases, the answer is no.

The ex -murderer, if he is unfit to

reenter societ y or otherwise has not repaid the optimal level of damages
(D), would not have been released from his incarceration to serve as a
police officer, and therefore, employment discrimination would n ot be
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necessary. If he has repaid the optim al level of damages, then we should
treat the ex-offender as if he has full y internalized the consequences of
his actions as we presume people are rational in making our social
policies. 57 In the event his actions were so vile that no single person
could full y internalize the action, such a person would never be released
from incarceration as his D value would be too high to repay .

As for

those who are not rational actors (that is, even if they pay D, they will
still commit the same offensive conduct), it is arguable that it is better to
place them with an employer than to leave them at large, where they have
already demonstrated an abilit y to commit their offensive a cts. For
example,

research

suggests

that

for

some

offenders,

a

biological

predisposition compels them to commit certain crimes, and therefore, the y
are unable to internalize D and change their behavior.

58

For this

relativel y small group of individuals, it would be better to have them
reenter societ y under the watchful eye of an employer, who already has an
interest in monitoring his employees ’ behavior, than to simpl y release him
into the population at large, monitored onl y by a disinterested parole
officer in an overworked off ice, or in many cases, by no one at all .
Finall y, there are any number of reasons that an ex -offender committed
his

original

crime

which

would

no

longer

appl y should

he

find

employment, but would appl y if he continued to lack lawful employment.
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Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 279 (8th Ed. 2011).
Adrian Raine, The Biological Basis of Crime, reprinted in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL 43- 74, (J.Q. Wilson & J.Petersilia, Eds., 2002).
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An ex-robber, for example, who stole to support himself or his famil y
would have less reason to commit the act again if he was l awfull y
employed. However, if he is released and cannot find employment due to
his criminal history, he would be placed back in th e same, and perhaps
worse, position he occupied when he made his choice to rob in the past.
The other possible argument against a prohibition on ex-offender
employment

discrimination

is

that

ex -offenders

are

unworthy

of

employment discrimination protecti on. Such an argument has been raised
against the already limited protections provided under state laws like the
Wisconsin prohibitions detailed above.
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Arguing that the existing

limitations on Wisconsin’s protections are not enough, at least one
commentator

advocated

abolishing

all

ex-offender’s

employment

discrimination protection since as a prior criminal, such individua ls are
“unworthy” of protection. 60

The ex-offender is unlike other protected

classes because the other classes are discriminated again st based on
factors outside their control , such as race or gender. 61 I would argue that
such a criticism is improper because as a societ y, we should not punish an
individual who has paid his debt to societ y, nor should we endorse the
suggestion that some people are simpl y less deserving of gainful
employment because they have made mistakes in their past.

It would be

fundamentall y unfair to hold a past crime, for which the ex -offender has
59

See supra Part VI.a.
Thomas M. Hruz, Unwisdom of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act's Ban of Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Conviction Records, 85 MARQUETTE L. REV. 779, 820-21 (2002).
61
Id.
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already paid, against an ex -offender in important aspects of his life, like
employment, forever.
offenders

into

a

Allowing such treatment would convert all ex -

permanent

underclass

of

citizens,

unworthy

of

employment, deprived of opportunities that would reduce their chances of
escaping their life of crime.
VII.

Conclusion
Without adopting serious reforms that prohibit discrimination against

ex-offenders in employment, ex -offenders will continue to recidivate,
societ y will continue to pay an economicall y inefficient premium to avoid
hiring them, and the problem of recidivism will continue.

Even though

employing ex -offenders represents a risk to the employer, it is clear that
the offender will be likel y to recidivate in any event against someone, and
societ y will be better off with the additional control it will have over an
employed ex-offender rather than one at large. At the very least, if the
employer hires the ex-offender, recidivism would be less likely due to the
imposition of social control, the clo ser eye the employer would use than
the government, and the lawful alternatives to crime the ex -offender
would have available. Therefore, it is in societ y’s, the ex -offender’s, and
the employer’s long-term interests that the ex -offender be free to seek
meaningful employment unimpeded by discrimination so that he can make
valuable contributions to societ y again.
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